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Dragan Poljak, Franjo Sokolić i Mirko Jakić u članku “On the Physical 
versus Philosophical View to the nature of Time” raspravljaju o nekim fizikal-
nim i nekim filozofskim aspektima vremena, postavljajući pitanje zašto se 
entropija povećava u smjeru t, a ne u smjeru (-t) .
U posljednjem članku knjige, “The Basic concepts of Physics”, autor 
Franjo Sokolić raspravlja o temeljnim pojmovima u fizici – prostoru i vre-
menu – kroz prikaz newtonova shvaćanja prostora i vremena te promjena u 
shvaćanju koje su uslijedile nakon teorije relativnosti. Autor smatra da teorija 
relativnosti ne eliminira metafizički pojam apsolutnog prostora i vremena u 
njutonovskom smislu .
Moderna atomska fizika uspješna je u opisu barem jednog dijela stvar-
nosti, stoga nam ona osigurava dokaze za promjene u našem shvaćanju znan-
stvenog znanja . Zbornik Physics and Philosophy predstavlja tako izuzetan 
zajednički napor znanstvenika u svrhu promišljanja znanosti onakvom kakva 
je danas i u svrhu nastavka plodnog dijaloga između znanosti i filozofije . 
Urednici ističu nužnost ovakvog dijaloga u Hrvatskoj, gdje često nailazimo 
na predrasude, posebice kod studenata filozofije koji često imaju odbojnost 
prema znanosti . njihova je nada pokrenuti dijalog o novom kurikulumu koji 
bi podrazumijevao kombinaciju humanističkih i znanstvenih predmeta .
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Harry G . Frankfurt, On Inequality (Princeton, nJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2015), 102 pp .
Almost forty-four years from the publishing of J . Rawls’ A Theory of Justice 
(1971), H . G . Frankfurt’s On Inequality (2015) is published . Parts of it were 
published before (“Equality as moral ideal” in 1987, and “Equality and Re-
spect” in 1997) . The form of the book is similar to his previous books, such 
as On Bullshit (2005), and On Truth (2006) . This book is composed of short-
ened and previously published materials rewritten in popular style . In this 
form, a substantial contribution is made as well, i .e . analyses, arguments, and 
objections to different standpoints are much clearer .
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During these forty-four years, the whole field of theory of justice was 
developed, i .e . standard standpoints, analyses, arguments, objections, and re-
plies were formulated . If it could be said that Rawls aimed to show that the 
whole issue of supposed conflict between freedom and equality is illusory by 
formulating his justice as fairness principle, perhaps it could be said at least 
that Frankfurt contributed to the idea by showing that the idea of moral 
relevance of so-called the doctrine of equality (especially economic) is illusory 
compared to his idea of the doctrine of sufficiency (which is anthropological) .
On one hand, Frankfurt agrees with Rawls that utilitarian theory of jus-
tice is objectionable, and that it should be replaced by an improved model . 
On the other hand, they go separate ways . Rawls, as many after him (some 
of which were his students, such as Thomas nagel), thought that equality has 
intrinsic moral value, while Frankfurt maintains that it hasn’t . He claims that 
equality, while being socially, politically, and economically important, still 
isn’t morally relevant . What is morally important is not that different people 
have different, say, amount of money (the issue of inequality); rather, what 
is morally important is that some people do not have enough (the issue of 
insufficiency) .
His argumentation proceeds in two directions . One is the negative way 
of objecting to equality generally, and particularly as a moral principle; the 
other is the positive way of arguing in favour of insufficiency as a moral prin-
ciple . His argument in the first direction tends to show that economic egali-
tarianism, while being good social, political, and economic doctrine is not 
authentic moral ideal as well . The second direction is that inequality, namely 
that different people don’t have the same amount of a good or a service, is 
morally irrelevant compared to the fact that among them some don’t have 
enough, which is morally relevant .
For the last claim he offers different arguments . How peoples’ lives com-
pare to lives of others is not morally important, while, do they have or haven’t 
good lives is . Comparison of bad with good lives is not important in order to 
understand that they are bad, quite the opposite, they are bad in themselves 
without any comparison needed, since such people lack something . He ap-
plies this to the concepts of a good life, quality of life, rights, respect, con-
sideration, and concern . For all of these instances it is not morally important 
that they are unequal for all; rather, it is morally important that they are evi-
dently insufficient for some . Each and every human is entitled to a particular 
amount of good, quality, rights, etc . It may be that some entitlements are the 
same for all people, but not because equality is important, rather it is because 
in these respects all humans are the same .
Furthermore, equality is not a matter of comparison, but non-personal 
principle as well . Respect, on the other hand, is a fine balance between im-
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partiality and avoiding arbitrariness and matching the particularities of the 
individual (he objects to the viewpoints of nagel and Berlin) . Claims of egali-
tarianism are derivative since they are grounded in more basic claims con-
cerned with respect and impartiality . These are morally superior because they 
are concerned with avoiding irrationality, and irrationality here manifests in 
e .g . failing to respect someone as ignoring the relevance of his/her life situa-
tion . When respect for a human is denied, almost as if his/her “very existence 
is denied”, or “the reality of human self is reduced” (2015: II, 10) .
Demands or desires for equality do not have moral importance, because 
such desires for humans “tends to distract us from recognizing the most au-
thentic human ambitions, which are those that derive from the character of 
our own lives, and not those that are imposed on us by the conditions in 
which other happen to live” (2015: II, 11) . This is the basic argument made 
by Frankfurt in this book . Other way around, if we are looking from the 
individual point of view, what is morally important is to recognize an au-
thentic human being and to treat it with respect, rights, etc ., and all of these 
have some manner and amount which is sufficient and in accordance with 
their individual nature, but in the same time impartial as well . This treat-
ment is basically moral . A human by being human is entitled to the amount 
of enough . Therefore, the idea of sufficiency has moral importance . On the 
other hand, morality of equality is derived from the morality of sufficiency . 
Some inequalities may be immoral not in themselves, but because they are 
rooted in insufficiency which is immoral in itself .
Let us now turn to some elements that can be objected to . His positive 
arguments are clear, at least in a nutshell, but his criticism isn’t . At the first 
look, it seems as if the target is the whole idea . Almost as if he is implicitly 
saying – sorry guys, if you wanted to discuss a moral issue, for the last fourty-four 
years you have been missing the point . The motive is obvious widespread idea 
that egalitarianism is inherently morally good because of moral goodness of 
fighting obviously immoral inequality . Popularity of the idea he finds in re-
cent book by T . Piketty, and in the State of the Union address by B . Obama 
(2015: preface; I .1) . On one hand, by mentioning these he wants to em-
phasize popular influence of the basic idea of equality and egalitarianism 
as a moral imperative and a doctrine . On the other hand, by mentioning a 
series of influential moral philosophers and economists (e .g . philosophers I . 
Berlin, n . Rescher, T . nagel, R . Dworkin, L . S . Temkin, R . E . Goodin, and 
economists K . Arrow, A . Lerner, P . Samuelson, and A . Sen), he emphasizes 
the influence of the doctrine among experts . These serve him as authors of 
particular arguments and in order to show how widespread the alleged mis-
understanding is .
Frankfurt’s basic argument can be misinterpreted . He is not claiming 
that equality is unimportant or that egalitarianism wrong, because it is obvi-
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ous that the phenomenon of inequality refers to the reality of social, politi-
cal, and economic, aspects of contemporary societies, and if this is so, then 
they matter . What he argues for is that, even if there is a moral dimension in 
fighting inequality, equality, and egalitarianism, this doesn’t mean that this 
dimension is intrinsically there . He claims that there is no intrinsic moral 
dimension in equality, but only economic . If it seems that there is a moral 
aspect in these spheres of justice, it seems so because they draw their morality 
from another source which is essentially moral, and that is poverty . There-
fore, he is not claiming that the theory of equality is completely wrong; it is 
wrong only as a moral doctrine, since there is nothing moral in it . Opposite 
to it, the theory of sufficiency is what matters morally (2015: I, 5–8) .
In other words, equality matters morally because there is underlying ele-
ment in it – the importance of avoiding insufficiency (e .g ., that different 
people have different amounts of money which are more or less unequal), 
but it doesn’t mean that this is immoral . What makes inequality immoral is 
the fact that among them there are people who are so “different” that they 
don’t have sufficient amount of money . So “having equally” matters because 
“having unequally” matters . But “having unequally” isn’t morally wrong in 
itself; it is morally wrong because “having unequally” for some means “not 
having enough” .
Poverty is a moral problem because essentially it damages a human being 
as a moral agent, and as a human being (some say that this is the weak point, 
since Frankfurt grounds his argument on the concept of rational agent which 
was debunked by behavioural economics) . On the contrary, one can fight in-
equality without fighting poverty . namely, if one is engaged in inequality and 
tries to reach some form of equality, then one is dealing with inequalities . As 
he, almost ironically, mentions at the beginning of the book, “Inequality of 
income might decisively be eliminated, after all, just by arranging that all in-
comes be equally below the poverty line .” (2015: I, 1) . In other words, one can 
make all equally poor . They are equal, so what is the problem? The problem 
is that they are poor . If there is poverty, then egalitarianism deals only with 
differences between various amounts of goods without taking into account 
that some of “the different” are different not in level, but in kind .
Part of the book he devotes to rejection of economic arguments for egali-
tarianism (the threshold effect) is particularly emphasized because it is used in 
the second part of the book concerning the difference in kind between in-
equality and insufficiency . The point of this part is to establish that “an egali-
tarian distribution of income may fail to maximize aggregate utility” (2015: 
I, 9–18), and he proceeds that it can in fact minimize aggregate utility (2015: 
I, 19–20) . He also discusses the moral intuition of egalitarianism which says 
that “economic inequality just seems wrong”, and argues that what one ob-
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jects if one perceives inequality is not that some have less than others, but 
that those who have less have too little (2015: I, 21) . namely, egalitarianism 
claims that if the problem of inequality is solved, then the problem of insuf-
ficiency would be solved as well . Frankfurt argues that they are logically inde-
pendent . There are two different issues . The one is of inequality and equality, 
and the other of insufficiency and sufficiency (his approach can be compared 
to the one by P . Singer in Ch . 8 of his Practical Ethics concerning the issue of 
poverty, where he presents the issue of poverty as the one of insufficiency, and 
sufficiency isn’t dependent on equality, rather on well-being) .
Later on in the book, Frankfurt discusses his concept of sufficiency 
or having enough (2015: 24–28) which basically means “to meet a certain 
standard” . Leaving the second part of the book to the reader, what seems to 
be important is stressing the issue of having enough . He naturally talks about 
it as if it is the same category as the one of having different . Perhaps these two 
belong to the different categories; the first to the category of needs, and the 
second to the category of preferences? (See Ch . 1–3 of L . Doyal and I . Gough, 
A Theory of Human Need, concerning the needs-preferences debate .) Given 
that this is so, perhaps it is possible to argue that what he defends is not just 
completely different theory of justice, or moral theory, but also completely 
different philosophical anthropology . Perhaps underlying anthropological 
principles should be explicated in order to understand the consequent differ-
ences in morality and justice, because taken as it is, it seems that Frankfurt 
writes about incommensurable models which are such not by themselves, but 
by being parts of different understanding of human being .
Although pursuit of egalitarian goals can reach some political and social 
ideals, in the last sentence of the book, he claims not only that it is wrong to 
claim that equality is a basic value, but that it is an obstacle to identification 
of “truly fundamental moral worth” (2015: II, 11), and insofar as this is the 
case, his book, by being a plea for a different understanding of social morality, 
is itself a plea for a different understanding of a human being .
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